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PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
GERI PASQUIN: Petitioner - Appellant
CANDANCE M. SOUTER: Respondent Number One - Appellee
KORY PASQUIN: Respondent Number Two - Deceased
Although Geri Pasquin named Kory Pasquin, deceased, as one of two
respondents, she did not separately serve his personal representative
with process prior to trial. Geri Pasquin lost at trial and filed a notice
of appeal. Candance M. Souter filed a motion for summary disposition
in the Court of Appeals that tested whether or not the decision below
was afinal,appealable, order. Because Geri Pasquin elected to oppose
that motion for summary disposition, she has waived and abandoned all
claims against Kory Pasquin, deceased, and the decision appealed from
was the District Court's final order as to all parties and all claims pled.
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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under UCA 78-2a-3(2)(h).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After the bench trial, the District Court entered afindingthat
court-ordered visitation would not be in the child's best interests and
denied Geri Pasquin's petition for court-ordered grandparent visitation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Geri Pasquin has failed to marshal the evidence as to the
findings of fact she seeks to challenge on appeal. She also failed to
preserve the issues she now seeks to raise on appeal. The novel legal
theories she now proposes on appeal are not provided for in the law.
ARGUMENT
Point One
Geri Pasquin has failed to marshal the evidence and
properly challenge the District Court's finding that grandparent
visitation would not be in the child's best interests. The District
Court correctly denied her petition based on this finding of fact.
There is no contention that the court below did not give Geri
Pasquin adequate notice of the place, time, and date of the bench trial.
-1-

Nor is there any contention that the court below did not give
Geri Pasquin an opportunity to present all the evidence and argument
in support of her position at the bench trial that she sawfitto present.
Geri Pasquin based her case at trial upon her own testimony and
upon the testimony of one other witness she produced (her daughter).
Thus, under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), on this appealfromthat trial,
"findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses." Where an appellant challenges the
trial court'sfindings,that appellant must "marshal all the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d
1068,1070 (Utah 1985). Where the appellant fails to so marshal the
evidence, the appellate court need not consider the challenge to the
findings of fact. Geri Pasquin raises numerous issues in a scatter-shot
fashion. And she never directly challenges the trial court's finding of
fact that visitation would not be in the child's best interests. Instead,
her challenges on appeal are all directed at the district court's factual
-2-

resolution of tangential evidentiary conflicts, and, even as to those, she
makes no attempt to marshal the evidence. Moreover, her brief on
appeal is confusing and incomplete. Although she presents selected
facts, those facts are poorly organized. She does not provide the
coherent background picture that is necessary to an understanding of
the arguments that she attempts to raise on appeal and she completely
ignores the fundamental factualfindingthat court-ordered visitation is
not in the child's best interests. Her approach to this case illustrates an
all too common problem. Although Geri Pasquin's lawsuit against
Candance M. Souter turned into a high profile case that was featured
on local television news and givenfrontpage coverage in the Salt Lake
Tribune, split page coverage in the Deseret News, and a house editorial
in the Salt Lake Tribune applauding the trial court's denial of visitation,
this high profile nature demands even more attentiveness on appeal to
presenting a very clear picture of facts and argument to the appellate
court, which, of course, does not have the benefit of having previously
reviewed the evidence and cannot observe the demeanor of witnesses.
In particular, appellate advocates must never assume that it is
somehow the appellate court's burden to comb through the record for
-3-

evidence supporting poorlyframedarguments. Appellate courts have
stated this principle on multiple occasions. See, e.g., MacKav v. Hardv.
973 P.2d 941, 947-48 & n.9 (Utah 1998); Walker v. U.S. Gen.. Inc..
916 R2d 903, 908 (Utah 1996). Thus, the challenge to thefindingof
fact as to the child's best interests should not be entertained on appeal.
The Court of Appeals initially lodged appellant's brief as
"unfiled" for her failure to file an appendix and duly instructed
appellant to file her appendix. Instead offilingone, appellant stated no
appendix was needed. The failure to provide the appellate court with
an appendix that contains the memorandum decision of the trial court
which appellant seeks to challenge, even after an express request was
made by the appellate court to provide an appendix, further renders this
appeal one which should be rejected. Not only did Geri Pasquin fail to
marshal the evidence in support of the court's finding that grandparent
visitation would not be in the child's best interests, but she even failed
to submit an appendix that included the memorandum decision within
which that finding of fact was set forth in a careful and thoughtful way.
It is not the appellate court's burden to comb through the record
and locate the memorandum decision containing thisfindingof fact.
-4-

Point Two
Geri Pasquin has also failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's finding that she made only some token
efforts to initiate visitation with her granddaughter and then
demonstrate that, viewing it in the light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's
finding. She has, thus, failed to properly challenge that finding.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), "findings of fact... shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
Where an appellant challenges the trial court's findings, that
appellant must "marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the
findings." Scharfv. BMGCoro.. 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985).
Where the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate
court need not consider the appellant's challenge to the findings of fact.
Not only does appellant fail to so marshal the evidence as to the
trial court's finding that she made only token efforts at initiating visits,
-5-

but, in apparent recognition of how meager those efforts at initiating
visits were, she tries to excuse herself by claiming that she "did all she
could" based on what she candidly concedes are "the fractious family
circumstances" (Appellant's Brief, P. 15) that were of concern to the
guardian ad litem and to the trial court in assessing best interests.
Thus, she not only fails to marshal the evidence as to the trial
court'sfindingthat she made only token efforts at visitation, but she
also concedes the very factual basis for thefindingit would not be in
the child's best interest to put the child in the middle of family conflict.
Point Three
Geri Pasquin failed to preserve the issues she now raises on
appeal and the District Court's decision brings finality to the case.
Before the Court of Appeals examines the District Court's denial
of the petition for court-ordered grandparent visitation, it "must resolve
whether [Geri Pasquin] failed to preserve below the issues [she] now
raises on appeal." Sittner v. Schriever. 2000 UT 45,115,2 P3d 442. If
so, the decision below isfinaland it cannot be reviewed via an appeal.
Geri Pasquin failed to preserve the issues she now raises on
appeal concerning two highly unfavorable guardian ad litem reports.
-6-

She never objected to their admission into evidence at trial.
Later, on appeal, she opposed a motion for summary disposition
that would have dismissed this appeal without prejudice. (She should
have joined in it so that this case would be brought back before the trial
court where she could then attempt to belatedly raise and preserve her
objections to both of the highly unfavorable guardian ad litem reports).
Thus, Geri Pasquin had ample opportunity to raise objections to
the two guardian ad litem reports that were highly unfavorable to her,
but she declined to do so. Somefinalityshould be brought to this case.
As the renowned Judge Friendly noted in the landmark case of
Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Refining Co.. 259 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.
1961), the term "finality" in litigation "may mean little more than that
the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court
sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again." In
this case the central issue of fact, whether visitation would be in the
child's best interests, was resolved within a memorandum decision
issued after a bench trial. Geri Pasquin then filed a notice of appeal
prior to entry of an order dismissing all claims pled in the petition with
prejudice. "[A] judgment which disposes of fewer than all of the
-7-

causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs complaint is not a final
judgment from which an appeal may be taken." Salt Lake Citv v.
Lavton. 600 P.2d 538, 539-40 (Utah 1979), citing J.B. & R.E. Walker.
Inc. v. Thavn. 17 Utah 2d 120,121,405 P.2d 342,343 (1965) (per
curium). Since this lawsuit was neither dismissed with prejudice by the
trial court nor adjudicated at all as to one of the named respondents,
Kory Pasquin, deceased, the memorandum decision appealedfromdid
not resolve the controversy between the parties and conclude the case.
Further, a party seeking to appeal a district judge's memorandum
decision that rejects a commissioner's temporary recommendation must
first obtain certification of the memorandum decision as afinalorder
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and/or obtain
permission from an appellate court to file an interlocutory appeal under
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as a commissioner's
temporary recommendation is inherently interlocutory. See First
Security Bank v.Conlin. 817 P.2d 298,299 (Utah 1991) (per curium);
Stumphv. Church. 740 P.2d 820,822 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). No such
URCP 54(b) or URAP 5 orders were sought or obtained. This lack of
a final order was raised in the motion for summary dispositionfiledby
-8-

Candance M. Souter. That motion was opposed by Geri Pasquin and
denied by the Utah Court of Appeals with leave to raise it again in the
consideration of this appeal on the merits. Thus, Geri Pasquin should
have raised the matter again in her brief in order to secure a dismissal
of this appeal without prejudice so that she could attempt to raise and
preserve the issues in the trial court she now attempts to raise here.
Instead, Geri Pasquin did not raise the issue of finality in her
brief and has waived it. Candance M. Souter, who has now been
forced to file a brief on appeal, expressly declines to raise the issue of
finality or to challenge this court's denial of her motion for summary
disposition. She consents to subject matter jurisdiction and to the
treatment of the memorandum decision in the court below as the final
order below, since the factual issue of whether visitation would be in
the child's best interests has been fully decided and there is "no really
good reason for permitting it to be litigated again." Lummus. supra.
Geri Pasquin's stated objective in her brief is to have more trial
court litigation take place. She could have achieved this simply by
conceding to (instead of opposing) Candance M. Souter's motion for
summary disposition, either initially or in her appeal brief on the merits.
-9-

Candance M. Souter states her objectives in defending this case
as (1) protecting her childfromcourt-ordered visitation, which, like the
two guardians ad litem and the judge, she finds to be contrary to her
child's best interests; and, (2) concluding all trial court litigation prior
to any appeal on the merits so that this case is limited to a single appeal
on the merits. In pursuit of her second stated objective, she duly filed
her motion for summary disposition. Now that this court has denied
that motion and she has had to bear the burden of preparing her brief
on the merits, she opposes any remand for further trial court litigation,
as this case and controversy should be ended, not endlessly litigated.
As Sir Edward Coke put it some four centuries ago, "interest
republicoe ut sit finis litum" or, it concerns the state that there be an
end to litigation. Ferrer's Case. 77 Eng. Rep. 263,266 (C.P. 1599).
It cannot reasonably be said that the trial court's memorandum
decision has left the relations between Geri Pasquin and Candance M.
Souter in such an unclear and undefined state that additional litigation
is needed to put an acceptably coherent end to the matter. In fact, just
the opposite is true, and the decision denying the petition for visitation
is a clear, comprehensible, and complete conclusion to this controversy.
-10-

Point Four
There is nothing in the Utah Rules of Evidence that requires
a District Court to conduct an interview of a child upon demand.
Geri Pasquin's disagreement with the District Court for declining
to interview the child has no support in the rules. Candance M. Souter
enjoys a parentalrightto exclude harmfully intrusive relativesfromher
child's life, and she deems Geri Pasquin's desire to use the judge as a
proxy for intrusion to show Geri Pasquin's lack of regard for the child's
best interests, her unhealthy desire to let an immature child dictate its
own best interests, and her undesirable appetite for family dramatics.
Point Five
The legal standard urged by Geri Pasquin would violate the
federal constitutional right enjoyed by fit and law-abiding parents
to parent their children free from unwarranted state interference.
The word "parent" is both a noun and a verb, and it is a parent's
right and responsibility "to parent" his or her child. The primacy of the
parent-child relationship and therightof a fit and law-abiding parent to
parentfreefromstate interference has been somewhat eroded in recent
decades with higher levels of micromanagement of family matters by
-11-

the judiciary that appears to have coincided with societal changes in
which the number of children being raised by both of their biological
parents in an intact family of origin has decreased in proportion to the
number of children being raised in other settings. This appears to have
resulted in interaction by judges with a larger proportion of children via
divorce and paternity litigation, weakening the role of parents with an
increase in the number of judicial forays into decision-making that was
previously left to the sound discretion of fit and law-abiding parents.
The District Court ruled that Utah's grandparental visitation
scheme was constitutional on its face. It then conducted a bench trial,
and, based on the evidence presented at that bench trial, it entered a
finding of fact that visitation would not be in the child's best interests.
Geri Pasquin now urges a novel new legal standard under which
the court would infringe upon Candance M. Souter's right to parent her
child because Candance M. Souter has chosen not to fully disclose all
of her reasons for declining to allow grandparent visits. (Inexplicably,
during her deposition, and in other discovery, Candance M. Souter was
never subjected to careful questioning by Geri Pasquin that would have
required her to disclose all of her reasons for declining to allow visits.)
-12-

Thus, having failed to establish (with competent trial evidence)
that an order of the court mandating grandparental visitation would be
in the best interests of the minor child, Geri Pasquin attempts to now
belatedly argue that because, in her view, no good reason has been
given to her for not allowing visits, she should be granted visitation.
This attempt to shift the burden to Candance M. Souter and to
require her to justify her disallowance of visitation is contrary to the
opinions of the Umted States Supreme Court in the recent landmark
case of Troxel v. Granville. 530 U.S. 57 (2000), which, although it
gave rise to a number of differing opinionsfromUnited States Supreme
Court, did somewhat roll-back the recent movement towards judicial
forays into the realm of fit and law-abiding parents. The legal standard
urged by Geri Pasquin should be rejected because it would result in an
unconstitutional order subject to being stricken down in the same way
a number of grandparent visitation orders have been stricken down by
a number of state appellate courts since the Troxel decision, as it would
improperly force a parent to affirmatively justify his or her preference.
See, among others, Punslev v. Ho. 105 Cal Rptr.2d 139 (Call.
App. 2001); Brice v. Brice. 754 A.2dll23 (Md. App. 2000): Hertz v.
-13-

Hertz. 717N.Y.S.2d (N.Y. 2000; In Re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3rd 357 Mo.
App. 2000): Neal v. Lee. 14 P.3rd 547 (Okla. 2000); Department of
Social and Rehabilitation Services v. Paillet. 16 P.3rd 962 (Kan. 2001).
This approach by Geri Pasquin is symptomatic of the underlying
causes of her failure to secure visitation voluntarily and her need to
resort to attempts to obtain it by court order. She views the situation in
terms of conflict and argument, and she believes that she has won that
argument and should therefore get visitation. She fails to grasp the
point that it is not a matter of winning an argument or prevailing in a
conflict, but of eliminating the argument itself and solving the conflict.
One viable trial strategy for Geri Pasquin would have been to
present evidence tending to show that contention had been eliminated.
Instead, contention oozed into the courtroomfromthe trial
witnesses called by Geri Pasquin, based on their demeanor in court.
One of the witnesses, for no apparent reason, gratuitously called
the paternal grandfather of the minor child a workaholic. The paternal
grandfather is, indeed, an industrious and productive individual, which
has benefited the minor child because it has enabled him to contribute
to her mother'sfinancialwell being and it has also kept him occupied
-14-

enough to keep his grandparent visitation at reasonable levels instead
of meddlesome and intrusive levels. Rather than denigrating this kind
hearted man via trial witnesses, Geri Pasquin may wish to emulate him.
Point Six
The best interests of the child will be served by having this
court give a gentle but firm "no" to Geri Pasquin and by having
Geri Pasquin take "no" for an answer with dignity and decorum.
In this, as in most controversies, there are two sides to the coin,
neither of which is wholly irrational. Geri Pasquin has a normal desire
to have her granddaughter visit with her and she sincerely believes that
court-ordered grandparent visits would be in the child's best interests.
On the other hand, the child's mother, two guardians ad litem,
and a judge of the Third Judicial District Court all find that visitation
by court order and mandate would not be in the child's best interests.
The District Court is the forum that is authorized and equipped
to decide such controversies. Since the Court of Appeals cannot see or
assess the demeanor of live witnesses in a live courtroom setting, both
common sense and the rules require this court to give due regard to the
-15-

trial court's ability to do so in this fact-laden controversy. Since the
District Court has acted within the scope of its authority and discretion
infindingthat court-ordered grandparental visitation would not serve
the best interests of the minor child (whose interests are paramount),
and since that finding is not clearly erroneous, this court should not
disturb the District Court's denial of the petition for a visitation order.
It is important to note that such a "no" answer to Geri Pasquin
would simply leave the possibility of any future voluntary visitation to
the discretion of the child's mother. If Geri Pasquin now takes "no" for
an answer with dignity and decorum, it will most likely help to increase
her prospects for future voluntary visits. But protracting this litigation
even more or again making herself available for an above-the-fold front
page Tribune photograph and interview will likely hurt those chances.
In the judgment of the editors of the Salt Lake Tribune, this case
is important enough that, while the case was still pending in the District
Court, they once made it the lead story of the day for the entire paper
and ran it on page A-l at the top of the page so that Geri Pasquin's
face peered outfromnews stands all over the state together with an
interview of her in which she related her side of the story. Then, when
-16-

the District Court denied her petition for visitation, that same paper ran
a house editorial applauding Judge Ronald E. Nehring for denying her
petition for grandparent visitation. Meanwhile, Candance M. Souter
declined all press requests to photograph her or her child and denied all
press requests to interview her or her child, choosing to respond to the
press through her counsel, who usually quotedfromthe public court
record. Not content to leave things alone, Geri Pasquin leaked pages
from Candance M. Souter's deposition to the press, even though it had
not yet been published in court and even though portions thereof were
later ruled to be inadmissible at trial by the District Court because they
contained a transcript of recorded unsuccessful settlement negotiations.
None of this has fostered a climate conducive to moving things
towards a situation where voluntary visits might be in the child's best
interests, but has, instead, continuously made the situation even worse.
Occasionally getting "no" for an answer is a part of every life.
But the way one takes "no" for an answer is a matter of choice.
Choosing to now take "no" for an answer with some dignity and
decorum would be a way for Geri Pasquin to increase the prospects of
getting to a point where her visits would be in the child's best interests.
-17-

Rather than taking issue with the trial court'sfindingthat there is
conflict between Geri Pasquin and the child's mother, itsfindingthat it
would not be in the child's best interests to place her in the middle of
that conflict, and the trial court's finding that Geri Pasquin made only
token efforts to keep any kind of contact with the child, and rather than
trying to get an appellate court to tell her that the District Court was
wrong in thesefindings,she should probably garner the humility and
insight necessary to consider whether the District Court's findings are,
in fact, correct. Only when she comes to the point where she accepts
the findings as correct can she then start taking meaningful steps to
acknowledge and solve the underlying problems by improving efforts
to initiate contact with the child while also working on ways to reduce
the conflict and shield the childfromthe harmful effects of the conflict.
The good thing about this approach is that it would all be taking
place in the private sphere,freefromstate involvement via the courts.
This approach avoids judicial micromanagement of parental
decisions, thereby preserving the liberty and privacy of the people
involved here in a manner consistent with our best legal traditions of
individualfreedomand restraint on the state going back to Runnymede.
-18-

Point Seven
Geri Pasquin declined to marshal the evidence because
doing so would have demonstrated the frivolity of her appeal.
In light of two separate guardian ad litem reports admitted into
evidence that formed a basis forfindingthat visitation would not be in
the best interests of the minor child, together with the demeanor of her
own witnesses in court, Geri Pasquin was simply not going to be able
to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindingsand then
demonstrate that, viewing it in the light most favorable to the court
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings.
Thus, she simply ignored this basic tenet of appellate practice.
Point Eight
Damages in the form of attorney's fees and double costs
should be awarded to Candance M. Souter under URAP 33.
Geri Pasquin's attorneys should have told her there was no way
to successfully challenge the trial court'sfindingsof fact on appeal and
she should have taken that "no" for an answer and declined to appeal.
Candance M. Souter is a mother with a young family who now
asks to be awarded attorney's fees and double costs under URAP 33.
-19-

CONCLUSION
The denial of the petition for visitation should be AFFIRMED.
URAP 33 attorney's fees and double costs should be awarded in
favor of Candance M. Souter against Geri Pasquin and/or her counsel.
DATED THIS 7THDAYQFFEBRU>

ROBERT jJ^OePIER
for uandance M. Souter
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
True copies of the foregoing were this-day hand-delivered to:
Brian Steffensen
VVil Middleton
Attorneys for Geri Pasquin
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City UT 84106
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
450 South State Street - W22
Salt Lake City UT 84111
DATED THIS 7TH DAyC)F FElkuAlfiN 2002.
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